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I. Introduction 
Shelby County v. Holder, the latest Supreme Court decision on voting 
rights, is the product of the post-racial movement.1 As Professor Gilda R. 
Daniels has explained, the post-racial movement is founded on the belief that 
President Obama’s election in 2008 symbolized the fact that “we have 
reached a place in our society where race has lessened in significance, 
declaring the country officially post-racial, where race bears little significance 
or consequence.”2  However, from the onset of the post-racial movement, 
critics have consistently argued that it would be used to minimize the 
ongoing existence, significance, and effect of racism.  As noted by Tukufu 
Zuberi, a renowned critical race theorist and social scientist: 
 
[T]he conservative project of associating 
colorblindness with racial enlightenment and racial 
justice advocacy with grievance politics is a blatant 
right-wing move, however, the so-called universal 
programs and universal politics advocated by 
liberals and many progressives alike are equally 
conservative. A more radical perspective views race 
as a problem to be overcome.3 
 
Post-racialism is a result-oriented movement that fails to acknowledge the 
reality of ongoing racial disparities in an effort to reestablish white 
supremacy.  Accordingly, the post-racial movement absolves those privileged 
* Attorney, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of General Counsel, Civil Rights and 
Finance Law Office. J.D. 2008, Boston College Law School; B.A. 2005, Simmons College.  I would 
like to thank Professor Anthony Paul Farley for encouraging me to continue writing scholarly 
articles and his tireless edits and encouragement.  Many thanks to my mother, Johnnie Hamilton-
Mason for her support and being the genesis of this dialogue.  The views expressed in this Article 
are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of EPA or the United States government. 
1 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2620 (2013). 
2 Gilda R. Daniels, Racial Redistricting in a Post-Racial World, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 949-950 
(2011). 
3 Tukufu Zuberi, Critical Race Theory: A Commemoration: Response: Critical Race Theory of 
Society, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1573, 1588 (2011)(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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by racial disparities without requiring them to fully acknowledge its 
enduring existence.   
 
In 2011, Professor Daniels, asked whether “with the Supreme Court’s 
construed admonitions against race-conscious redistricting, and its 
endorsement of influence districts as a post-racial panacea, how can we 
preserve minority electoral opportunities…?”4  After the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Shelby County, we can answer Professor Daniels’ question by 
affirmatively stating that minority electoral opportunities can no longer be 
preserved with any statute that requires whites to acknowledge racial 
inequity in voting.  Although white Americans have primarily perpetuated 
racism in this nation, they are bystanders to racial oppression, in the sense 
that they are unaware of their own complicity, and therefore, struggle to 
reconcile it with their racially privileged experience in this nation.5  The post-
racial movement has provided an opportunity for white America to avoid the 
uncomfortable experience of acknowledging racial oppression, because it 
shifts the focus to reconciliation.  As demonstrated by the Supreme Court, 
evidence of discrimination in voting will continuously be trivialized in a 
purportedly post-racial world, where the fundamental presumption is the 
declining significance of race.   
 
This Article will examine the post-racial movement’s perpetuation of 
racial disparities in voting by means of this denial of the ongoing existence, 
significance, and effects of race in this nation.  In particular, the post-racial 
movement’s effect on the bystander mentality of white America will be 
analyzed.  Further, this Article argues that Shelby County is an example of 
such denial and proposes an amendment to the Voting Rights Act (VRA)6, 
which shifts the burden of protecting equal opportunity to the voting district 
as a proactive measure.  By not requiring any recognition of ongoing racism, 
this approach can be implemented successfully in American society where 
acknowledgement has not occurred.   
 
II. Section 4 and 5 of VRA.  
In 1965, Congress enacted the VRA to prevent and remedy racial 
discrimination in voting.  In particular, the Voting Rights Act states that no: 
 
[V]oting qualification or prerequisite to voting or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or 
4 Daniels, supra note 2, at 949 (2011). 
5 Susan J. Brison, Surviving Sexual Violence: A Philosophical Perspective in VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 11, 17 (Stanley G. French, et al. Eds., 1998). 
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq. 
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applied by any State or political subdivision in a 
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of 
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote 
on account of race or color, or in contravention of 
the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2).7   
 
In addition, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prevents “jurisdictions that 
had a voting test and less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in the 
1964 Presidential election” from making changes in their voting procedures 
without the approval of either the Attorney General or a court of three 
judges.8  In 1965, the covered jurisdictions included Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, 39 counties in North 
Carolina, and 1 county in Arizona.9  As noted by Professor Daniels, “[s]ection 
5’s preclearance requirement is preemptive because it mandates that a 
covered jurisdiction demonstrate prior to the enactment of legislation that its 
proposed change is free from a discriminatory purpose or effect.”10   
 
In 2010, Shelby County, Alabama sued the Attorney General in 
Federal District Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that sections 4(b) and 
5 of the Voting Rights Act are facially unconstitutional and a permanent 
injunction against their enforcement.11  The Federal District Court ruled 
against Shelby County, finding that “the evidence before Congress in 2006 
was sufficient to justify the reauthorizing §5 and continuing the §4(b) 
coverage formula.”12  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit (U.S. Court of Appeals) affirmed the decision of the Federal District 
Court.13  In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of 
certiorari to review the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals, finding section 
4(b) of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional.14 
 
III. Critical Analysis of Shelby County and Bystander Denial. 
The Supreme Court in a five-four decision reversed the decision of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals.  Chief Justice Roberts in the opinion of the court held 
that the only compelling interest justifying the preclearance remedy and 
coverage formula was the existence of gross voting disparities defined by race 
7 Enforcement of Voting Rights, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(a) (1965). 
8 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620. 
9 Id. at 2620 (noting that the Voting Rights Act was reauthorized for an additional 5 years in 
1970; 7 years in 1975; 25 years in 1982; and 25 years in 2006). 
10 Daniels, supra note 2, at 955. 
11 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2621- 2622. 
12 Id. at 2622. 
13 Id. 
14 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2631 (2013). 
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in the covered states.15  Despite the Justice Department’s explanation of the 
deterrent effect of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and its contention that 
“there need not be any logical relationship between the criteria in the 
formula and the reason for coverage,” the Supreme Court’s apparent reason 
for finding section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional is their 
belief that: 
Coverage today is based on decades-old data 
and eradicated practices. The formula 
captures States by reference to literacy tests 
and low voter registration and turnout in the 
1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have 
been banned nationwide for over 40 years. 
And voter registration and turnout numbers 
in the covered States have risen dramatically 
in the years alone.16 
 
In particular, the Supreme Court noted that over the course of the nearly 50 
years since the VRA was enacted “things have changed dramatically.” 17 
 
The Supreme Court ignored substantial evidence of ongoing 
discrimination in the covered jurisdictions.18  Congress found that “vestiges of 
discrimination in voting continue to exist as demonstrated by second 
generation barriers constructed to prevent minority voters from fully 
participating in the electoral process.”19  Specifically, Congress explained that 
the term first generation barriers, “describes barriers to registration and the 
ability to cast a vote,” while the term second-generation barriers:  
 
Refers to other means of depriving minority voters 
of the opportunity to participate in the democratic 
process on an equal basis--means such as 
discriminatory management of district lines, the 
adoption of at-large election schemes, and other 
dilutive techniques.20 
 
In its brief, the Justice Department cited several instances where 
states or municipalities took actions that impaired or limited the voting 
15 Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2617. 
16 Id. at 2627- 2628. 
17 Id. at 2625. 
18 Brief of Respondent at 21, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), 2012 U.S. 
Briefs 96, at 21.  




                                                          
 
Shelby County v. Holder: A Critical Analysis of the Post-Racial Movement’s 
Relationship to Bystander Denial and its Effect on Perceptions of Ongoing 
Discrimination in Voting 
 
power of blacks.  In one case, the “all-white incumbent town governance in 
Kilmichael, Mississippi, attempted to cancel an election shortly after black 
citizens had become a majority of the registered voters.”21  In another case, 
the location of the polling place was changed and the Attorney General 
objected to the relocation of a polling place in Johnson County, Georgia, from 
the county courthouse to the American Legion, noting that “the American 
Legion in [that county] has a wide-spread reputation as an all-white club 
with a history of refusing membership to black applicants” and was “used for 
functions to which only whites are welcome.”22   
 
Shelby County itself had been a defendant in a suit brought to enforce 
Section 2 of the VRA.23  The result of that suit was a finding that the 
Alabama legislature had intentionally discriminated against African-
American voters by authorizing counties to switch from single-member 
districts to at-large voting, prohibiting single-shot voting in at-large elections, 
and requiring numbered posts in at-large elections.24  Moreover, in 2006, 
“Congress also gathered thousands of pages of testimony and documents 
chronicling ongoing problems of vote suppression, voter intimidation, and 
vote dilution throughout covered jurisdictions.”25   
 
In reviewing Shelby, the Supreme Court intentionally departed from 
the standard it articulated in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, “Congress may 
use ‘any rational means’ to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial 
discrimination in voting.”26  In particular, the Supreme Court deviated from 
47 years of precedent with respect to the VRA in Shelby, and relied on the 
less deferential standard explained in City of Boerne v. Flores, which required 
that enforcement legislation be based on a congruent and proportional 
relationship between a constitutional injury and the means adopted to 
prevent that injury.27  However, the standard established in City of Boerne 
was a particularly inappropriate vehicle for reviewing the VRA, because the 
21 Id. at 24. 
22 Brief of Respondent at 27, Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), 2012 U.S. Briefs 96, 
at 27. 
23 See Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F. Supp. 1347, 1356-1360 (M.D. Ala. 1986). 
24 Brief of Respondent at 27, Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96), 2012 U.S. Briefs 96, 
at 38. 
25 Id. at 33. 
26 Jason J. Kelly, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is No Longer Tailored to Remedy Current 
Patterns of Voting Discrimination: The State of Section 5 after Northwest Austin Utility District 
No. 1 v. Holder, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 67, 75 (2011) (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 
324 (1966)).  
27 See id. at 77 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1977)).  
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case involved a challenge to a local historical preservation ordinance on the 
basis of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 28   
 
One possible explanation for the majority’s opinion in Shelby County is 
bystander denial.  In Surviving Sexual Violence: A Philosophical Perspective, 
Susan J. Brinson articulates her theory that bystanders in cases of sexual 
violence have to struggle to identify with victims because of their inability to 
reconcile such acts with their perception of the world.29  Specifically, 
Professor Brinson explains that:  
 
Where the facts would appear to be 
incontrovertible, denial takes shape of attempts to 
explain the assault in ways that leave the 
observers’ worldview unscathed. Even those who 
are able to acknowledge the existence of violence 
try to protect themselves from the realization that 
the world in which it occurs is their world and so 
they find it hard to identify with the victim. They 
cannot allow themselves to imagine the victim’s 
shattered life, or else their illusions about their 
own safety and control over their lives might begin 
to crumble.30  
 
Bystander denial is not limited to incidents of sexual violence.  It 
occurs in all sociopolitical contexts in which there is a victim of any form of 
oppression.  White Americans, in particular, suffer from profound bystander 
denial with respect to racial oppression.  Furthermore, white Americans are 
unable to fully absorb the magnitude of racism in this country because they 
are unaware of their bystander denial.  It is impossible for them to recognize 
that their understanding of the world is a consequence of racial privilege, not 
an objective reality.  As explained by Paulo Freire:   
 
To the oppressor consciousness, the humanization 
of the ‘others,’ of the people, appears not as the 
pursuit of full humanity, but as subversion. The 
oppressors do not perceive their monopoly on 
having more as a privilege, which dehumanizes 
others and themselves. They cannot see that, in the 
egoistic pursuit of having as a possessing class, 
28 Kelly, supra note 26, at 77. 
29 Brison, supra note 5, at 17.  
30 Id.  
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they suffocate in their own possessions and no 
longer are; they merely have. For them, having 
more is an inalienable right, a right they acquired 
through their own ‘effort,’ with their ‘courage to 
take risks.’31 
 
Paulo Freire describes the blindness and self-delusion, born of self-interest 
that privilege creates.  The acquisition of power, a monopoly on the voting 
franchise is one more “possession” and privilege to which they are entitled.   
 
This distorted reality of white Americans undermines their ability to 
appreciate the severity of all forms of voting discrimination and to relegate it 
to the past, to the first generation barriers. As noted by Joel Heller, a voting 
rights scholar, the likelihood of denial increases when “the potential 
abridgement does not take the form of an explicit denial of access to the ballot 
box but instead stems from structural choices like the location of polling sites 
(…), or a practice that dilutes the value of a vote, such as redistricting or 
annexation.”32  Under these circumstances, policymakers may try to escape 
the shame or the aggravation of reminders of the era of rampant racial 
discrimination by claiming those problems no longer exist.33  Within the 
context of racial discrimination, the media has captured elected officials 
making innumerable attempts to rationalize widespread racism within “their 
world” context.   
 
For example, on August 14, 2013, Senator Rand Paul (R-Ky.) stated 
“[s]o really, I don't think there is objective evidence that we're precluding 
African-Americans from voting any longer.”34  Likewise, on the July 25, 2013 
edition of Fox News' America Live conservative Washington Post columnist 
Marc Thiessen, he contended: “voter ID laws do not disenfranchise 
anybody.”35  To racially oppressed populations, these statements seem 
absurd, but to white Americans with bystander denial, such propositions 
support their understanding of the world.   The only facts that registered 
with these speakers might have been the election of a black president, Barack 
Obama, and the size of the turn-out of black and latino voters, which was 
31 PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 58-59 (2005). 
32 Joel Heller, Falkner’s Voting Rights Act: The Sound and Fury of Section Five, 40 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 929, 952-53 (2012). 
33 Id. 
34 Paige Lavender, Rand Paul: There's No “Objective Evidence” Of Racial Discrimination in 
Elections, HUFFINGTON POST (August 14, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/14/rand-
paul-racial-discrimination_n_3758035.html. 
35 Sergio Munoz, Fox Uses Bogus Arguments to Attack DOJ Voting Rights Action against Texas, 
MEDIA MATTERS (July 25, 2013), http://mediamatters.org/tags/marc-thiessen. 
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thought to propel his election.  The reports of the strategies used to suppress 
that vote and the strategies used to deter voters are dismissed out of hand.   
 
Studies of bystander denial support the conclusion that many white 
Americans, like bystanders to sexual violence, find it less challenging to 
acknowledge racism and discrimination remote historical incidents which are 
thought to be outside of “their world” context. The limited contexts in which 
the Supreme Court has found there to be a compelling interest for race-based 
decision making is evidence of the resistance on the part of a majority of the 
justices to the idea that racism and discrimination are contemporary 
problems. For example in Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Supreme Court “upheld 
a congressional preference for minority contractors because the measure was 
legitimately designed to ameliorate the present effects of past 
discrimination.”36  Likewise in University of California Regents v. Bakke,  
 
Four Members of the Court concluded that, while 
racial distinctions are irrelevant to nearly all 
legitimate state objectives and are properly 
subjected to the most rigorous judicial scrutiny in 
most instances, they are highly relevant to the one 
legitimate state objective of eliminating the 
pernicious vestiges of past discrimination.37 
 
Nonetheless, the compelling interest that the Supreme Court has 
found in eliminating the current effects of past discrimination has never 
extended the diversity paradigm or principle outside the educational 
context.38  As explained by Vicki Lens, a social policy scholar: 
 
An important rationale for upholding the plan in 
Johnson was that it was designed to ‘attain a 
balanced work force, not to maintain one.’ This 
distinction between ‘attaining’ and ‘maintaining’ 
was crucial to the Court's narrative of substantive 
equality. It reiterated it several times, thus making 
it clear that affirmative action was intended as a 
temporary measure to compensate for past 
exclusions and not to assure diversity for diversity's 
36 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 301 (1986) (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448, 492 (1980)). 
37 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 302, citing Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362. 
38 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003); see also Vicki Lens, Supreme Court 
Narratives on Equality and Gender Discrimination in Employment: 1971-2002, 10 CARDOZO 
WOMEN'S L.J. 501, 541-42 (2004).   
123 
 
                                                          
 
Shelby County v. Holder: A Critical Analysis of the Post-Racial Movement’s 
Relationship to Bystander Denial and its Effect on Perceptions of Ongoing 
Discrimination in Voting 
 
sake. Thus, the Court rejected a difference theory 
approach that would legitimize diversity as an end 
in itself.39  
 
The majority opinion in Shelby County, exhibits the Supreme Court’s 
enduring reluctance to sustain racial diversity in voting “for diversity’s sake.”  
However, this creates a potentially untenable predicament where the 
Supreme Court is unwilling to acknowledge the existence of voting 
discrimination, in part because their understanding of racism is “shaped by 
the most extreme expressions of individual bigotry,” but also unwilling to 
uphold proactive programs to prevent discrimination.40  What is the future of 
voting rights in this country where the Supreme Court has ruled that the 
coverage formula identified in section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act is 
unconstitutional because occurrences of voting discrimination in the covered 
jurisdictions have declined but are not obsolete?   
 
IV. Equal Opportunity in Voting: a New Method of Preventing 
Discrimination. 
 
In this social climate, the VRA must be amended to establish an 
affirmative program that does not explicitly or implicitly rely on recognition 
of ongoing discrimination in voting. Although the coverage formula set out in 
sections 4(b) and the preclearance requirement of section 5 of the VRA 
effectively prevented discrimination before Shelby County, these tools may 
not be useful in the future given the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that 
it recognizes only the most overt or explicit forms of voter suppression as 
enforceable discrimination.41 
 
Title VII of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) 
offers a plausible solution to this predicament.  Section 717 of Title VII states 
that the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is responsible for 
the annual review and approval of a national and regional equal employment 
opportunity plan submitted by all federal agencies.42  Pursuant to 
Management Directive 715, “[a]gencies have an ongoing obligation to 
eliminate barriers that impede free and open competition in the workplace 
and prevent individuals of any racial or national origin group or either sex 
39 Lens, supra note 38, at 541-42 (citing Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)). 
40 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 183-84 (2012).  
41 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2629 (“no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching 
the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, 
and that clearly distinguished the covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that time.”). 
42 Employment by Federal Government, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16(b) (1964). 
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from realizing their full potential.”43  Agencies are required to conduct a self-
assessment of their workforce, in which they identify potential barriers to 
equal employment based on lower than anticipated demographic data.44   
 
Specifically, agencies must analyze their new hire, promotion, and 
senior grades data categorized by major job series and race/national 
origin/sex at every stage of personnel transaction (i.e. relevant civilian labor 
force, application, qualification, and selection rates) to determine if there is a 
barrier to equal employment opportunity.  For example, the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission advises that a race/national origin/sex 
group’s application rate in a particular job series that is lower than the 
groups representation in the relevant civilian labor force is problematic and 
requires an agency to investigate whether there is a barrier to equal 
employment opportunity by planning activities that address the 
representational disparity.45 
 
In light of the Supreme Court’s finding that section 4(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act is unconstitutional, the VRA should be amended to include an 
affirmative process that is analogous to the one described in Section 717 of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  Annual reporting requirements that 
mandate that each voting district compare the race/national origin/sex 
demographic data of the potential voter pool to the voter participation rate.  
Guidance can be issued that requires a voting district to determine if there is 
a barrier to equal opportunity in voting if the voter participation rate of a 
particular race/national origin/sex demographic group is less than their 
representation in the potential voting pool.  In such situations, voting 
districts, like federal agencies, should be required to create and implement 
programs that facilitate voting by underrepresented race/national origin/sex 
demographic groups.  Voting districts should be required to submit annual 
compliance reports to the U.S. Department of Justice, which would maintain 




The Supreme Court’s failure to recognize the enduring significance of 
discrimination in voting is misguided.  However, their reasoning in Shelby 
County is embraced by many members of white America and is not limited to 
43 Memorandum to Heads of Federal Agencies, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 
(October 1, 2003), http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/directives/md715.cfm. 
44 Id. 
45 Memorandum to Heads of Federal Agencies, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 




                                                          
 
Shelby County v. Holder: A Critical Analysis of the Post-Racial Movement’s 
Relationship to Bystander Denial and its Effect on Perceptions of Ongoing 
Discrimination in Voting 
 
voting discrimination.  The ongoing marginalization of oppressed populations 
has effectively precluded white America from understanding the existence, 
significance, and effect of race in this nation.  Furthermore, the perpetuation 
of the post-racial movement coupled with bystander denial has exacerbated 
white America’s inability to recognize and appreciate modern-day racial 
oppression.  Accordingly, the VRA must be amended to create an affirmative 
program that ensures equal opportunity in voting that avoids the use of 
discretion, which will undoubtedly minimize the severity of discrimination. 
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